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The Syrian government’s initial violent 
response to peaceful protests which began 
in 2011 has led to armed conflict, evolving 
into a regional proxy war. This conflict has 
affected Syrian society at all levels, with 
implications for neighbouring countries. 
Hundreds of thousands have been killed and 
injured, millions others displaced within and 
beyond the country’s borders, and large parts 
of Syria are no longer under full government 
control. In some of these areas public ser-
vices barely function and the Syrian state 
appears to be absent on the ground but for 
the bombs it drops from the sky. Nascent 
governance structures have emerged in these 
areas to restore public services and security 
from the bottom-up. 
Much has been written about the impli-
cations for individual security and human 
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Security Gap in Syria: Individual 
and Collective Security in ‘Rebel-held’ 
Territories
Ali Abdul Kadir Ali*
This paper examines security in Syria through the conceptual lens of the security 
gap, understood as the gap between security practices and objectives which have 
implications for individual and collective security. Practices of security can be 
the state apparatus, the military, and militias. The objective – safety – can refer 
to the safety or security of a range of collectives including the state, political 
parties, and ethnic groups, while individual security refers to the general safety 
of inhabitants and the protection of human rights. This paper compares the secu-
rity situation in so-called ‘rebel-held’ areas of Syria where alternative governance 
structures have emerged, examining the security approaches of Local Administra-
tive Councils and Rebel Councils in Deir Azzor, Manbij, Dera, and areas dominated 
by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). It argues that security and safety 
are strongly influenced by authority formation and the nature of deals and rela-
tionships involved in the formation of these nascent authorities. It also argues 
that security in these areas is strongly influenced by the Syrian government, which 
disrupts collectives that threaten its own collective security while giving limited 
support to those which serve its agenda of retaining power. It also demonstrates 
the limited utility of the ‘regime’ vs. ‘rebel-held’ dichotomy, as rebel groups at 
times must accommodate the Syrian state in limited ways for instrumental pur-
poses. The article is based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey in 2013–2014, inter-
views conducted in 2015, and secondary sources based on field research. 
* Department of International Development, London 
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rights in Syria under the rule of Bashar Al 
Assad and his late father Hafez. Systematic 
human rights abuses under both their gov-
ernments, including today in areas under 
government control, are well documented 
(Batatu 1999; George 2003; HRW 2010, 
2012; Lefevre 2013). Less well understood is 
the security situation in areas not under full 
government control. Grounded in fieldwork 
conducted in Turkey in 2013–2014, inter-
views conducted in 2015, and secondary 
sources based on field research, this article 
sets out to provide a nuanced and alterna-
tive understanding of security conditions in 
Syria, with a particular interest in inhabitants 
of so-called ‘rebel-held’ areas where alterna-
tive governance structures have emerged. 
In majority-Kurdish areas, the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) is the most 
dominant organisation. In other ‘rebel-held’ 
areas, Local Administrative Councils (LACs) 
and Revolutionary Councils (RCs) have been 
formed. 
To achieve its objective this article applies 
the notions of security objectives and secu-
rity practices, and the ‘security gap’ between 
them (see Kaldor & Selchow 2015). The secu-
rity objective refers to what it is that is being 
secured. Security objectives can be both indi-
vidual and collective, depending on what is 
understood to be the objective of security, 
and on what is defined as the collective – 
it may be the state, a community, a society 
(Kaldor & Selchow 2015: 8). The objective of 
security may also be individualistic, secur-
ing individual safety and rights, depending 
on the form of political authority (ibid.). 
The practices of security are understood as 
the interplay of security apparatus – which 
consists of police, military and intelligence 
institutions – and the strategies and tactics 
deployed (Kaldor & Selchow 2015: 6). They 
are inherently collective since practices rep-
resent expressions of political power and 
authority, which may be a combination of 
domestic, national and global institutions. 
(ibid.). The gap is the mismatch between 
the practices and objectives which creates 
varying levels of insecurity depending on the 
context (Kaldor & Selchow 2015: 7). The secu-
rity gap can also refer to the inherent gap 
between collective and individual security, 
as objectives may be collective or individual, 
but practices are always collective (ibid.). As a 
consequence the security apparatus is often 
more preoccupied with its own security than 
with the safety of its constituents. There are 
of course a range of actors involved in Syria’s 
war, including armed groups, political par-
ties, and nascent governance structures with 
varying security agendas.
The article puts forward two main argu-
ments. First, the war is highly decentralised 
and fragmented (as well as fluid) and the 
security gap is experienced very differently 
in different localities. Second, individual 
security, particularly in areas no longer under 
governmental control, is very much related 
to the nature of political authority and the 
process of its formation. Furthermore, even 
groups emergent from an attempted revolu-
tion against the authoritarian rule of a nar-
row elite have practiced forms of exclusion 
in their nascent authorities.
The article is divided into three main parts. 
It starts with a section that briefly outlines 
some of the literature on authority in ungov-
erned spaces in the Middle East and how this 
might relate to notions of collective and indi-
vidual security. In the main section the article 
presents its findings regarding LACs and the 
Kurdish areas. It concludes with reflections 
on the variation in the nature of the security 
gap in different ungoverned spaces.
Ungoverned Spaces
The Syrian civil war has resulted in a num-
ber of ‘ungoverned spaces’ in areas beyond 
the control of the central government. 
Ungoverned spaces do not lack governance – 
almost all areas inhabited by humans display 
some sort of governance; rather, they are 
spaces where territorial state control is ceded 
to or shared with actors ‘other than legally 
recognised sovereign authorities’ (Clunan & 
Trinkunas 2010b: 275). ‘Ungoverned spaces’ 
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emerge in diverse contexts owing to delib-
erate state policies, or with states’ ‘witting 
collaboration,’ usually combined with local 
and global dynamics (Clunan 2010: 4). States 
‘deliberately create ungoverned spaces or 
accept softened sovereignty when it suits 
their purposes’ (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010a: 
25). In the scholarly literature, various terms 
are adopted such as hybridity or public 
authority to describe informal mechanisms 
of governance in Somaliland (Renders & 
Terlinden 2010; Boege et al 2008), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 
Nigeria (Meagher 2012). Mampilly (2011) has 
examined ‘rebel governance’ in the DRC, Sri 
Lanka, and in what is now South Sudan. In 
what follows I focus on the work of Baylouny 
(2010), one of the few authors to apply this 
type of analysis to the Middle East.
Baylouny (2010) surveyed different types 
of authority which emerge in ungoverned 
spaces in the Middle East and the actors form-
ing these authorities. Her work examines 
areas of the Middle East which are relatively 
unregulated by the state: informal settle-
ments; refugee camps which have become 
urban settlements; and other neglected 
urban margins. They differ from ‘rebel-held’ 
areas in Syria in that they are not attempts 
by rebels to govern, but are similar in that 
these areas lie within formal state territory, 
but are neglected, under-regulated, and sub-
ject to state authorities’ predatory actions. 
These areas lack the public goods that the 
state furnishes elsewhere, prompting certain 
actors to engage in service provision, includ-
ing regarding security and welfare (Baylouny 
2010). Actors, such as militias, utilise a com-
bination of violence, identity, and service 
provision to fill what Hall and Biersteker call 
‘functional holes’ of public services and order 
which the state has chosen not to furnish in 
marginalised areas (Baylouny 2010: 137).
Residents of these areas are more likely to 
be excluded from the formal economy and 
reliant on informal means of generating 
income, leaving them susceptible to bribe 
extraction from corrupt law enforcement 
officers. Intermediaries who negotiate with 
or bribe (higher-level) state officials to pro-
tect residents of unregulated spaces can gain 
prestige and authority (Baylouny 2010: 139). 
In effect, they make deals with the more 
powerful state collective to furnish a level 
of protection from it for individuals of the 
‘ungoverned’ population. However, although 
the fulfilment of these functions can lead 
to ‘influence in the community and acqui-
escence to governance, this dynamic does 
not necessarily imply either legitimacy or 
approval’: communities which benefit from 
services may also suffer from the brutality 
and arbitrariness of these actors’ govern-
ance (Baylouny 2010: 138). The collective 
that makes an agreement with the state may 
provide security in the sense of protection 
from state predation, but the objective may 
be to simply carve out space within which to 
implement its own security objectives, rather 
than to protect individuals’ safety, rights, and 
freedoms.
Combinations of religion, identity, and vio-
lence may be mobilised to facilitate authority 
generation (Baylouny 2010: 138). In inse-
cure areas, those with violent resources can 
obtain influence by making public spaces 
safe, and by creating systems for dispute set-
tlement and reconciliation (Baylouny 2010: 
141–3). They may be formal courts, religious 
or otherwise, or less formal systems. Violence 
understood as necessary to preserve a com-
munity against enemies is a source of legiti-
macy for authority seekers. The construction 
of such enemies justifies the violent regula-
tion of public space. (Baylouny 2010: 146)
A common identity, religious or territorial, 
can legitimise authority seekers, especially if 
it distinguishes the community from a real 
or imagined enemy (Baylouny 2010: 147). 
Those with, or who are seeking, power con-
struct boundaries between groups and social 
categories in order to include and exclude 
particular categories, what Yuval-Davis (2011) 
calls the politics of belonging. Linked to this 
is ethnic security, based on the claim that 
only rule by one’s own ethnic community 
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can provide protection and security (Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2015). This type of authority leans 
more towards collective security objectives 
than to protecting individuals. It may be a 
form of ethnic-security or securing the inter-
ests of a different collective, such as specific 
militias. 
The PYD mobilises ethnic identity and this 
has had important implications for its col-
lective security objectives. By contrast, LACs 
have been more likely to favour individual 
security objectives, although they sometimes 
create their own boundaries, excluding those 
who do not have ‘revolutionary credentials’. 
However, the pressures and constraints 
imposed by the state have been more pow-
erful than those which civilian populations 
have exerted on nascent authorities. They 
include shelling and air strikes, and the denial 
of public services. The effectiveness of these 
nascent governance structures is closely tied 
to deliberate state policies. In Kurdish areas 
of Syria, the PYD has been allowed to form 
an administration because the Assad gov-
ernment believes the group can be used to 
secure government objectives. The PYD oper-
ates under constraints, including intermit-
tent embargoes imposed by the confluence 
of conflicts with Turkey and the Iraqi KRG, as 
well as its fight against ISIS (Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria). But these constraints pale in 
comparison to those experienced by LACs, 
the success of which is deemed to threaten 
the security of the Assad government. It is 
this contrast between the security gap in 
PYD-run areas and in areas ‘governed’ by 
LACs that I examine in the rest of this paper.
The PYD: Collective or Individual 
Security Objectives? 
The PYD was founded in 2003. Although it 
denies it is a branch of the Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan – now 
imprisoned in Turkey – it belongs to an 
umbrella organisation supportive of the PKK 
(Lowe 2014: 227).1 Syria expelled the PKK 
in 1998 under Turkish pressure and before 
the uprising against Assad began, PYD 
members were subjected to longer prison 
sentences than other outlawed Syrian parties 
(Savelsberg 2014: 97–99). Its current leader, 
Saleh Muslim, has said he spent several 
months a year imprisoned by the Assad gov-
ernment since 2003 (Guerin 2012). He fled 
to Iraq in 2010 but was allowed to return in 
2011. 
The PYD claims to be building a decen-
tralised and inclusive democratic entity con-
cerned for individual rights, which feature 
strongly in The Constitution of the Rojava 
Cantons.2 ‘Rojava’ means Western Kurdistan, 
and includes non-contiguous pockets of 
Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria 
including Afrin, Kobane and the Jazeera. 
Articles of the constitution stipulate that: 
(1) Rojava institutions shall protect democ-
racy and human rights; (2) nobody shall be 
subjected to torture or cruel treatment; 
(3) arbitrary arrest and detention is forbidden; 
and (4) rights to civic and political associa-
tion and assembly are protected.3 According 
to Article 15, the YPGs (People’s Protection 
Units) are ‘the sole military force’ of the three 
cantons and are commanded by ‘the Body of 
Defence – a part of the Executive Council – 
through its Central Command.’ However, the 
YPG is widely understood to be under PYD 
command.
The PYD has established councils and 
governance structures tasked with security, 
policing, and aid distribution, and formally 
opposes creating an ethnically-defined terri-
tory ruled by a central authority.4 The PYD 
has set up People’s Tribunals, enforced by 
the Asayish – the PYD’s police force – which 
its foreign relations spokesman Alan Semo 
says will work to international and universal 
legal standards implemented by specialised 
lawyers (ICG 2014: 14). 
Relative stability and security ensued after 
Syrian forces withdrew from Kurdish areas 
and the PYD took over security provision. 
Some cultural, political, and civic activities 
have thrived, including open debates about 
developing local government (Lowe 2014: 
228–229). The regions were secure enough 
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for a delegation of activists and academics to 
complete a nine-day tour there in December 
2014. Afterwards they unanimously declared 
that they believed accountable democratic 
structures had been established there and 
that programmes for civic tolerance and 
gender liberation had been advanced (ROAR 
2015). Their statement was uncritical of the 
Rojava experiment. Some were impressed 
by ‘democratic confederalism’ (Miley & Riha 
2015): a devolved type of governance advo-
cated by PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan that 
abandons the outmoded system of nation 
states (Ocalan 2011).
Ocalan was inspired by Murray Bookchin, 
a former Marxist-Leninist turned libertar-
ian anarchist, who promoted ecological 
and democratic confederalism, according to 
Biehl, partner and collaborator of the late 
Bookchin (Biehl 2012) and participant in the 
delegation to Rojava. Miley and Riha were 
also impressed by the level of gender eman-
cipation they saw (Miley & Riha 2015). Also 
among the delegation was David Graeber, 
an academic and anarchist activist who was 
convinced that Bookchin’s ideas were being 
implemented in the region,5 including direct 
democracy, collectivisation, efforts to dis-
sipate coercive policing powers to society, 
and gender emancipation (Graeber 2015). 
Women have notably been visible in the del-
egates’ accounts of Rojava’s administrative 
structures. The PYD is also keen to highlight 
women’s presence in the war against ISIS. 
The YPJ, or ‘Women’s Protection Units,’ are 
brigades formed of women, though their 
commanders may be YPG men.6 Why women 
fight in separate brigades and not within the 
YPG is not clear, nor is the extent of their 
decision-making influence. But the strong 
presence of women in Rojava contrasts with 
other areas in Syria discussed later in this 
paper. Furthermore, Rojava is described 
as an anarchist-inspired experiment disin-
terested in state-building because, accord-
ing to its founding principles, creating a 
nation-state does not bring real democracy. 
A report on human rights abuses in Rojava, 
which included criticism of the lack of inter-
national standards in court trials (HRW 2014), 
was dismissed on these grounds. ‘Human 
rights assumes the existence of a top-down 
state and tries to moderate it, but if you 
don’t have a state at all, apparently that’s a 
human rights violation too’ (Graeber 2015). 
The somewhat bizarre argument is that the 
PYD’s disinterest in respecting human rights 
is related to its disinterest in being a state.
Other sources provide a different perspec-
tive about the PYD’s disinterest in human 
rights. Savelsberg believes the PYD is playing 
power politics dressed up as Kurdish nation-
alism (Savelsberg 2014: 102). While the PYD 
may be partially experimenting with demo-
cratic confederalism, the idea remains vague 
and the PYD’s commitment to implement-
ing idealistic principles remains untested. 
The ideology may be trumped by a desire 
to retain control (Lowe 2014: 238–239). 
The creation of Rojava and its administra-
tive structures was a top-down PYD initiative 
conducted without transparency (Savelsberg 
2014: 101). Elections for the ‘People’s coun-
cil of Western Kurdistan’ (PCWK) were held 
in November 2011 but only the PYD stood 
for election and there is little distinction 
between the PCWK and the PYD (Lowe 2014: 
228). Rojava institutions are dominated by 
PYD-affiliated associations with an assort-
ment of ethnic representatives with ‘nothing 
to lose from joining the project’ (ICG 2014: 
15). The PYD monopolised aid distribution in 
Qamishli according to two men from the city 
now living in Turkey (Interview April 2013). 
The People’s Tribunals have reportedly been 
arresting civilians who have done nothing 
wrong, using a hybrid penal code akin to a 
YPG military law (ICG 2014: 14). Tellingly, 
when the party’s leader, Saleh Muslim, spoke 
in London in 2013 he was unable to give a 
concrete example of anything the PYD had 
been doing to promote democracy in Syria, 
despite being Deputy General Coordinator 
of the National Coordination Body for 
Democratic Change in Syria (Muslim 2013).7 
The PYD’s primary objective appears to be 
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securing its own power rather than pro-
tecting the rights it mentions in its own 
constitution.
Violence and collective security 
practices of the PYD
Structures of governance created by the PYD 
are supported by the capacity to deploy vio-
lence to maintain power, order, and collective 
security. Identity and violence are mobilised 
to implement this collective security agenda, 
akin to methods Baylouny outlined (2010), 
using violence to repel a common enemy. 
When ISIS attacks Kurdish populations 
in northern Syria (OHCHR 2014: 5),8 the 
YPG gains credibility by repelling ISIS and 
reclaiming seized territories. Saleh Muslim 
has made implicit plays on identity, conflat-
ing the (Arab) opposition to the Assad gov-
ernment with ‘Salafis and extremists’; the 
Kurds, he implies, are moderate democrats 
(Muslim 2013). His words create bounda-
ries in a politics of belonging and exclusion 
which presents the PYD as the righteous 
protectors of Kurds and other ethnic and 
religious groups. The decision to include 
representatives from ethnic groups in the 
Rojava assembly implies a commitment to 
ethnic quotas and principles of collective 
ethnic security. The message is that members 
of those communities will be secure under 
PYD rule because it allows members of their 
own community to be involved – nominally 
at least – in governance. 
There seems to be a contradiction between 
the security of the party (the PYD) and the 
safety of Syria’s Kurdish community. Symbolic 
assertions of ethnic identity are manifested 
in PYD areas: in Qamishli new bilingual signs 
are in place, ‘Western Kurdistan’ appears on 
vehicle license plates, and Kurdish flags have 
appeared (Glioti 2013a). However, a Qamishli 
Syrian now living in Turkey explained that 
the flag was specific to the PYD and that 
other Kurdish parties, as well as Syrian revo-
lutionaries, were banned from flying their 
own flags (Interview August 2013). Members 
of the Rojava delegation were concerned that 
the symbols used were not inclusive enough 
as they were limited to Kurdish nationalism 
and risked alienating non-Kurds who ‘might 
misidentify the struggle as one for a Greater 
Kurdistan’ (Miley & Riha 2015). While this 
may make Kurdish Syrians feel safer, it may 
be perceived as threatening by non-Kurdish 
groups and may not sit comfortably with 
Syrian Kurds opposed to the PYD. Savelsberg 
is sceptical even of the PYD’s Kurdish nation-
alism, arguing it is used to mask PYD power 
politics (2014: 102).
The rivalry between the Iraqi-based pro-
Barzani Kurdish National Council (KNC) and 
the PYD has adversely affected the individ-
ual safety of Syrian civilians in Kurdish areas 
by resulting in border closures between Iraq 
and Syria that prevented aid from reach-
ing populations in PYD areas. In the spring 
of 2013, aid from the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) in Iraq reached Qamishli 
and was distributed in an orderly way by the 
PYD, according to two Qamishli men living 
in southern Turkey. The men opposed PYD 
politics and condemned the party's use of 
arbitrary detention but appreciated the rela-
tive order and security that Qamishli bene-
fited from (Interview April 2013). However, 
by the summer of 2013, the borders were 
closed and what little aid was promised by 
the Iraqi KRG was not able to enter PYD 
areas; KRG and PYD personnel were not 
allowed to cross the border either (ICG 2014: 
10–11). One report claimed that the KRG 
had closed the border after the PYD arrested 
75 Syrian KDP members (Star 2013).9 When 
the KRG opened the border for a three-day 
period, 70,000 Syrian Kurds took the oppor-
tunity to flee a situation of food, electricity, 
and water shortages for Iraqi KRG areas (ICG 
2014: 10–11). Some were prevented from 
leaving by the PYD and the Asayish police, 
its officials claiming that this was to coun-
ter attempts to change the demographic 
balance of Syrian regions at the Kurds’ 
expense (Glioti 2013c). In Amuda, residents 
attempted to flee the reign of the Asayish 
and the poverty which came with PYD rule 
but were blocked by the Asayish at the 
border (Glioti 2013b). 
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PYD and YPG violations of human rights 
Human rights activists have reported viola-
tions by the PYD, the YPG, and Asayish. These 
include incidents of arbitrary detention and 
violence against civilian opposition mem-
bers. A human rights activist, whose organi-
sation has been documenting violations in 
Syria, reports that the PYD frequently detains 
activists, and that interrogations mimic those 
of Syrian government forces. Pre-conceived 
charges of supporting terrorism and treason 
are presented to detainees who are often 
tortured (Interview May 2014). Human Rights 
Watch has reported other abuses: arbitrary 
arrests, abuse in detention, violations of due 
process, uninvestigated killings and disappear-
ances, and the recruitment of children into 
PYD security forces (HRW 2014). Furthermore, 
the PYD has used expulsion as a way to punish 
dissent: 
. . . They arrested five individuals and 
exiled them to Iraqi Kurdistan. Some 
are not allowed to return to Syria, 
political party leaders for example . . . 
The PYD has prisons and practice tor-
ture. Many people who have left the 
Kurdish areas in Syria have not left 
because of the brutality of the regime 
or because of the difficulties of daily 
life there – although daily life is very 
difficult there – but because of the 
pressures from the PYD (Interview 
May 2014).
Numerous reported examples of human 
rights abuses exist:
1.  A young Kurdish Syrian was beaten 
by YPG members in Afrin because of 
her civic activism against the Assad 
government (Interview April 2013). 
2.  “The PYD does not want to have 
any critics in the country,” said a 
Kurdish man the PYD had targeted; 
the PYD detained and tortured 
his niece in Afrin before expelling 
her and her relatives from Syria 
(Kurdwatch 2015).10 
3.  In Amuda, PYD forces closed down a 
radio station which opposed the PYD 
(Interview May 2015). In the same 
village, Asayish and YPG units killed 
seven protesters in June 2013 as part 
of a crackdown against rival Kurdish 
and pro-FSA groups (Glioti 2013b). 
4.  The YPG and Asayish vandalised offices 
of the rival Yekiti party and attacked 
their members (Glioti 2013b). 
5.  Youth committee members from rival 
Kurdish groups were detained and 
officially accused of drug trafficking,  
but the perceived motivation for their 
arrests was political, prompting a 
series of public sit-ins. These sit-ins 
evolved into large demonstrations at 
which witnesses say YPG and Asayish 
units opened fire (Glioti 2013b; Syria 
Untold 2013). The YPG ordered a 
curfew the following day and raided 
homes for “saboteurs,” one of many 
terms used by the Syrian government 
since 2011 to discredit its opponents. 
To prevent further demonstrations, 
mourning relatives were prevented 
from gathering (Glioti 2013b), echoing 
tactics of Syrian government forces. 
The PYD ‘interferes in everything, and uses 
force to hinder any activity beyond its author-
ity,’ according to Mohammad Wali from 
the Amuda Coordination Committee (Syria 
Untold 2013). Asayish police forces began 
implementing a forced conscription law, 
passed by the PYD, which states that each 
family must provide one man aged 18–30 in 
military units (Syria Direct 2014).11 At times 
the PYD mirrors the authoritarianism of the 
Ba’th system, but under a Kurdish nationalist 
cover (Savelsberg 2014: 86). 
Ethnic and Party Security, and the 
security of the Assad Government
What is the explanation for this gap between 
individual rights-based security the PYD 
professes, their abusive actions in securing 
the interests of their party, and collective 
ethnic-security? Part of the explanation may 
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be found in reports of the PYD’s acceptance 
of material assistance from the Assad gov-
ernment (and its ally Iran), and a growing 
dependency on the government as a source 
of service and resource provision (ICG 2014: 
4–5, 8–9; Savelsburg 2014: 98). When the 
PYD took control of towns in Kurdish areas 
it did so not in coordination with other 
Kurdish parties but seemingly with the tacit 
support of the Syrian government (ICG 2014; 
Lowe 2014; Savelsburg 2014). Early on in 
the uprising, the Assad government played 
the communal card, covering cities like 
Damascus and Latakia with posters that car-
ried slogans like ‘Beware those who support 
sectarianism’ (author’s observations 2011) 
and promoting the idea that only the Assad 
government could be trusted to protect the 
country’s minorities against an opposition it 
labelled as ‘extremist Islamists.’ This was at a 
time when no such threat existed, represent-
ing the deliberate construction of ‘ontologi-
cal insecurity’ (Bubandt 2005) as a means to 
secure its power through fear, and became a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
PYD leader Saleh Muslim has parroted this 
narrative since his return to Syria, attempt-
ing to portray the PYD as protectors of 
moderates and minorities and the opposi-
tion as ‘extremist Salafis.’ His claims have 
been bolstered by the presence of armed 
groups linked to Al Qaida who have attacked 
Kurdish communities whilst at the same 
time oppressing other groups which oppose 
it and the Assad government. At times the 
YPG provoked Islamist groups into attack-
ing Kurdish areas by launching offensives 
against them in coordination with a pro-
regime militia, with the aim of creating dis-
tractions from their oppressive practices in 
places like Amouda (Savelsburg 2014: 100–
101). This is part of a government strategy 
to compel Syrians to seek refuge in ethnic 
and confessional communities, ‘to split each 
community into competing branches, divid-
ing those who support it from those who 
oppose it; and to empower its supporters by 
charging them with providing government 
services from areas in which it remains pre-
sent’ (ICG 2014: 23). The PYD can be viewed 
as a useful organisation for the Assad gov-
ernment to split the Kurdish opposition into 
different groups, weakening its potential to 
challenge its power. 
The relationship between the YPG and FSA 
is complex, featuring both cooperation and 
violent confrontation (Lowe 2014: 229).12 
Most of the Kurdish opposition parties 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ stance vis-à-vis the 
Syrian revolution; the support given to the 
PYD by the Syrian government has succeeded 
in preventing Kurdish populations from join-
ing the revolution (Savelsburg 2014: 98). The 
Syrian government is still present in the cit-
ies of Qamishli and Hassake and it is only 
from these locations that state employees 
can collect salaries. The Syrian government 
has not allowed the PYD to manage salary 
payment, preferring instead to further cen-
tralise this function. Prior to 2011 they could 
collect salaries from local government offices 
in their home districts (ICG 2014: 9). 
In schools, the Ba’ath-approved curricu-
lum has not changed, despite PYD requests 
for the introduction of the Kurdish lan-
guage. The Damascus education directorate 
refused these requests, threatened to stop 
all teachers’ salaries, and sent inspectors to 
enforce the curriculum (ICG 2014: 9, 23). The 
relationship between the PYD and the gov-
ernment of Syria is ‘expedient and there is 
underlying hostility’ (Lowe 2014: 230).
The PYD is not being allowed to imple-
ment as much of an ethnic security program 
as it might like to, and certainly not more 
than its patrons in Damascus will allow. It is 
authorised to implement a security agenda 
to protect the PYD’s interests only so far as 
they do not threaten the collective security 
of the Assad government. Ethnic identity can 
only be asserted within parameters accepta-
ble to the Syrian government’s own security 
objectives. In the early days of the uprising, 
the government made a limited reversal of 
its politics of exclusion towards the Kurds. It 
passed Decree 49 in April 2011, introducing 
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a naturalisation process for many previously 
stateless Syrian Kurds, though the instru-
mental nature of the move was not lost on 
the Syrian Kurds who benefitted (McGee 
2014). It was seen as a strategic move to 
pacify Syria’s Kurds and prevent a Kurdish 
rebellion similar to that which took place 
in 2004. In addition, government forces are 
now deliberately treating Kurds detained 
for taking part in protests less harshly 
than non-Kurds. A Kurdish human rights 
defender said:
Before the revolution Kurds were 
treated worse than others. When I was 
recently detained with many other 
activists, the security officer spared 
me a beating [because I am Kurdish]. 
He asked each single detainee his 
name and where he was from to fig-
ure out who was and wasn’t Kurdish 
(Interview May 2014).
The same man reported that Syrian govern-
ment forces actively encouraged Kurds to 
pursue demands for ethnic autonomy and 
independence: 
I was taking testimony from a 
[Kurdish] revolutionary activist who 
was detained by the regime. The secu-
rity officer interrogating him said, 
‘Why are you raising that flag [of 
the revolution]? Why don’t you raise 
your own flag, the Kurdish flag? Why 
don’t you demand your own country? 
(Interview May 2014)
Assertions of ethnic identity, which divide 
the opposition and unsettle supporters of 
the uprising, are permitted by the Syrian 
government. The PYD’s ascent, influenced as 
it is by the PKK, does not sit well with the 
Turkish government which fears the emer-
gence of a PKK influenced entity in Syria, and 
the possibility this will lead to demands for 
autonomy or secession in Kurdish-majority 
areas of Turkey. 
Perhaps nowhere else in Syria is there a 
clearer example of an ‘ungoverned space’ 
engineered to secure state interests than in 
PYD-run areas. The Syrian government ceded 
partial control of these zones to the PYD, a 
‘softened sovereignty’ that the government 
tolerates temporarily because it secures gov-
ernment security objectives. PYD security 
practices – the party and its militia – are 
securing the objectives of power retention, 
retaining the recently enhanced power of 
the PYD, and protecting the interests of its 
patron of expediency, the Syrian govern-
ment. It also suggests that the nature of deals 
involved in the formation of political author-
ity influences security objectives. The PYD 
appears to have struck a deal with the gov-
ernment of Syria and this may explain why 
its YPG militia has been abusing individual 
rights of those who are deemed a threat to 
the Syrian government. It may also relate 
to the oppression experienced by the PYD 
under the Ba’ath regime. Savelsberg says this 
is ‘a telling example of what Vincent Geisser 
calls the “authoritarianism of the domi-
nated”’ (Savelsberg 2014: 102).
In the next section, I will discuss the 
markedly different experience of nascent 
governance structures, including local admin-
istrative councils (LACs), and show how the 
fragmented and decentralised nature of the 
war has influenced LACs to make deals with 
certain groups, including the Syrian state, in 
processes of authority formation. 
Local Administrative Councils: 
Governance that protects Individual 
Security?
In areas no longer under full government 
control, Syrians formed Local Administrative 
Councils (LACs), grassroots public adminis-
trations seemingly working to maintain and 
restore essential public services. Their crea-
tion appears to have emerged from need as 
much as from desire for political change. 
However, many LACs profess desires to cre-
ate an alternative system: a representative 
and inclusive democratic government, with 
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higher levels of legitimacy than an authori-
tarian system. However, LACs vary consid-
erably from one another due to differing 
socio-economic contexts; as such, this does 
not always translate into inclusive, election-
based formation processes. 
According to a LAC representative from the 
town of Idleb, ‘Each council has its own way, 
each province has its own circumstances’ 
(Interview August 2013). There appears, 
though, to be certain patterns: when Syrian 
government forces withdraw from areas of 
resistance, the withdrawal of service pro-
vision often follows, prompting LAC for-
mation (Menapolis 2013: 4). Networks of 
citizens organise to provide humanitarian 
relief, basic services, and even courts of jus-
tice. LACs are also said to coordinate with 
armed groups, characterising LACs as civilian-
led organisations with armed representa-
tion (Salmon 2013). The first instance of 
this emerged in Zabadani, a suburb of Rural 
Damascus, where protracted conflict neces-
sitated coordination between civilian and 
armed groups. Numerous councils have long 
come to the realization that coordination 
with armed groups was necessary for opera-
tional and security reasons; as such, FSA rep-
resentation on councils is common (Salmon 
2013). It appears however that LACs’ priori-
ties are coping with dangers and needs due 
to armed conflict and resultant public ser-
vice withdrawal just as much as, if not more 
than, they are about establishing democratic 
forms of political authority. 
LACs and self-selection in Deir Azzor
Although professing a commitment to 
democracy and political rights, some coun-
cils were formed secretively, without elec-
tions, for fear of state reprisals. The first LAC 
in Deir Azzor was a top-down creation whose 
objective was perceived to be securing inter-
ests of collectives such as the Syrian National 
Council (SNC) – then the formal opposition 
based in Turkey with backers in Qatari state – 
rather than the interests of local Syrian collec-
tives, such as ‘revolutionary’ clans. The term 
‘revolutionary’ is used frequently by activ-
ists and I understand it to mean those who 
oppose Assad rule and demonstrate this by 
organising or attending protests, for exam-
ple. I interviewed ‘Nasir,’ a member of a com-
mittee instrumental in the formation of Deir 
Azzor City’s LAC in eastern Syria. His narra-
tive is the basis for this section. He belonged 
to the Revolutionary Council (RC) – from 
which the LAC originated – whose activi-
ties focussed on organising protests against 
Assad. The RC had a humanitarian commit-
tee, a media website, and connections to 
armed groups, and its members began trav-
elling abroad to garner international support 
and recognition from the SNC. However, the 
local community believed the SNC priori-
tised the interests of its foreign backers, like 
Qatar, over local concerns. The SNC became 
part of the new National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces – the 
Coalition – which appointed individuals to 
represent LACs, sometimes before LACs had 
actually been formed on the ground. 
The prioritisation of the collective security 
objectives of the Coalition and its foreign 
state backers was rejected in Deir Azzor city 
and province, whose citizens and various col-
lectives were not consulted in the process. In 
rural areas, villages and small towns instead 
established their own councils, selecting 
respected individuals to represent clusters 
of villages and towns in a provincial LAC. 
Among them were professionals, commu-
nity figures, and rebel fighters. Tribal leaders 
were also included but only those known to 
have been involved in revolutionary activity. 
When the provincial LAC was formed the 
city’s LAC collapsed because, says Nasir, of its 
lack of legitimacy. Some members were for-
mer government officials, accused of corrup-
tion, and others were rejected because they 
lacked revolutionary credentials. Generally 
speaking, members were ineffective and 
failed to communicate with the Provincial 
Council. A politics of belonging was at play: 
those belonging to the old order did not 
necessarily belong to the new one, and were 
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considered a threat to its integrity. A bound-
ary was drawn by the ‘revolutionary’ collec-
tive, deciding upon individuals’ eligibility to 
participate in new governance structures. 
Nasir described how he and others belong-
ing to the ‘new order’ formed an LAC by 
invitation and consultation. They created 
an ‘investigation committee’ to locate peo-
ple with the required skills and esteem in 
the community to join. Members of this 
committee were not allowed take part in 
the LAC. Elections were later held in secret 
due to safety concerns, mostly surrounding 
the risk of arrest and possible government 
attacks on large gatherings. The elections 
were held in secret locations and the elec-
torate therefore was narrow, consisting only 
of activists and rebel fighters. Fighters were 
not allowed to become members of the civil-
ian councils, but were nevertheless, said 
Nasir, supportive of the process, ‘We are in 
a revolutionary situation so the LAC must 
involve the rebels . . . . When we get rid of the 
regime, the LAC will step down and it will 
be up to the people to decide whether or 
not to elect other people’ (Interview August 
2013). The relatively narrow base of the Deir 
Azzor LAC suggests that the security of the 
rebels is prioritised over the inclusion of 
the population in council formation. There 
is little data regarding how populations of 
Deir Azzor perceive LACs. However, a report 
from Bouleil, a town of 25,000 people and 
an estimated 10,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), described resentment at the 
failings of an unelected council dominated 
by a group called the Body for Revolutionary 
Movement (BRM) (DB 2014). The BRM 
invited activists to attend a meeting during 
which an election would be held, but, one 
activist claimed information regarding this 
meeting, including its location, was lim-
ited. The Bouleil LAC media representative 
defended its actions, arguing that even the 
Prophet Muhammad was ‘discreet about crit-
ical matters’, so they too should be discreet, 
especially as they were ‘in the range of the 
regime’s artillery’; however, the organisation 
also expressed willingness to embrace every-
one and hear criticism (DB 2014). Criticising 
nascent authorities from a distance is easy, 
but it does appear that local populations 
genuinely resent exclusion from processes of 
council formation and being denied the pos-
sibility of participating in decisions regard-
ing how to provide essential services. 
Manbij: Individual Security?
In Manbij, in Aleppo province, a Revolu-
tionary Council (RC) was active after gov-
ernment forces withdrew in mid-July 2012, 
apparently striking a deal with local revo-
lutionaries. Security forces agreed not to 
fire on protestors if they limited demon-
strations to 15 minutes. When the army 
withdrew, Manbij became surrounded by 
rebel forces and unable to receive reinforce-
ments (Reuter & Adhun 2012). The Local 
Coordination Committees led the organisa-
tion of peaceful protests against the Assad 
government and eventually formed an RC – 
consisting of 20 members acting as the 
executive (Munif 2014b) – which governed 
Manbij from 2012 until ISIS took over in 
2014 (Menapolis 2013: 14). A Revolutionary 
Trustees Council was formed which, says one 
account, has 50 members (Menapolis 2013); 
while another account says it has 600 mem-
bers and acts as a legislative house (Munif 
2014b). To test RC members’ commitment 
to the revolution, and counter simple oppor-
tunism, an Appeals Council was created to 
assess the revolutionary credentials of can-
didates for administrative positions. There 
are disputes however, and competing coun-
cils are regularly formed and dissolved, due 
to the RC’s perceived lack of legitimacy and 
efficiency (Menapolis 2013: 14). 
The revolutionaries’ exclusivity, which pre-
vents outsiders from becoming Revolutionary 
Trustees, may be the cause of these disputes. 
According to Munif (2014b), who spent 
several months in Manbij and northern 
Syria in 2013, ‘so many people were left out 
and the revolutionaries alienated them-
selves.’ Disagreements were reported when 
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members of Manbij’s RC attempted to gain 
a seat on Aleppo’s Governorate Council, elec-
tions for which were held in Turkey in March 
2013. Rival committees were unsuccessful in 
claims to represent Manbij (Menapolis 2013: 
15). Nevertheless, Munif (2013) points out 
that the RC originally consisted of 53 popular 
neighbourhood committees formed clandes-
tinely when government forces were active 
in Manbij. Committees were preparing to 
defend their neighbourhoods against attacks 
by government forces and their Shabiha 
militia (Munif 2013). Although elections 
are unmentioned in accounts of institution 
formation in Manbij, and there are accounts 
of rival councils forming, there clearly exists 
political plurality in the Trustees Council. 
It is a space in which nationalists, leftists, 
traditionalists, and Islamists meet together 
and exchange their views about governing 
Manbij; however, because of patriarchal val-
ues, women were excluded from the Council 
(Munif 2014a). Before the religious court 
became the main arena for dispute settle-
ment, a plurality of courts existed: a secular 
Revolutionary penal court, an Islamic court, 
and a court based on Customary Law which 
protects tribal interests (Munif 2014a). A 60 
member-strong police force, which backed 
the new and better funded religious court, 
was formed in June 2014, improving secu-
rity in the area (Munif 2014b). The police, 
under the oversight of the RC, however did 
not prevent a proliferation of armed groups 
in and around Manbij, pushing certain indi-
viduals to take the law into their own hands. 
The current politics of belonging in the 
opposition is not inclusive towards women. 
Because of a historic patriarchy unchallenged 
by the Syrian state, the RC and Trustees 
Council had no women members (Munif 
2014a). This is common in the formal Syrian 
opposition; despite the active participation 
of women in the revolution, aid work, and 
human rights activism, they remain absent 
or under-represented in formal structures 
and organisations (McGee 2012). Women 
were also under-represented in training 
workshops for LACs which I observed in 
Gaziantep in August 2013. This is in strong 
contrast to areas under PYD control where 
the party is eager to display women’s involve-
ment in civic and military activities.
Despite many challenges in Manbij, cir-
cumstances allowed for service provision and 
for a level of individual security. Although 
government forces have attacked Manbij’s 
infrastructure (Reuter & Adhun 2012), the 
city does not seem to have experienced the 
levels of infrastructural and institutional 
destruction common elsewhere in north-
ern Syria (though recent airstrikes by US-led 
forces may have altered this [Reuters 2015]). 
Government forces were not defeated mili-
tarily but withdrew as a result of a mixture 
of civil disobedience and negotiations 
(Menapolis 2013: 13). Furthermore, Manbij 
has electricity due to its proximity to the 
Euphrates dam – the government keeps 
Manbij on the grid for fear of reprisals against 
the dam which would threaten the provision 
of electricity to government-controlled areas 
(Reuter & Adhun 2012). 
Generally speaking, the Assad government 
has long neglected the area, which explains 
the absence of a strong military or security 
presence in the flour-producing town (Munif 
2014b). Upon regime withdrawal, opposition 
leaders asked local sheikhs in the mosques 
to order government employees to con-
tinue working and maintain services. One 
member of the Trustees Council explained, 
‘We knew who was working for the regime, 
but to keep services running we decided 
to deal with them later’ (Interview August 
2013). Government workers who did not 
openly oppose the government continued to 
receive salaries, suggesting that ‘loyal’ work-
ers may still be passing information to cen-
tral authorities. The state court, which deals 
with land registry and personal status issues, 
continued to work with direct counterparts 
in Damascus (Menapolis 2013: 13). 
The way in which Revolutionaries decided 
to deal with government employees – aided 
by the fact that the town was not a priority 
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of the Assad government – was instrumental 
to their success. Gardner (2012: 28) observes 
that the state is not only conceived of appa-
ratuses, laws, and bureaucracies, but also ‘a 
configuration of powers inseparable from 
the embodiment in individual citizens,’ 
(emphasis in the original). Rather than purg-
ing these individuals, the RC pragmatically 
allowed them to continue working. Manbij 
still experienced weekly airstrikes (Munif 
2014a) suggesting there was no high-level 
deal with the Syrian government – rather 
the Revolutionaries accommodated rem-
nants of the the state in the sense of the 
individual Syrians who are its embodiment. 
This accommodation helped to keep the 
peace, but was also expedient in so much 
as the Revolutionaries lacked the expertise 
needed to run essential infrastructure – 
electricity, water, and the flour mills (Munif 
2014a) – without retaining ‘loyal’ govern-
ment employees. 
Rivalry with rogue FSA units and ISIS
The Revolutionary Council had rivals in addi-
tion to the Syrian state. When the FSA bri-
gades, with which the RC had relations, left 
the town for the front, criminal brigades 
emerged and antagonised the population 
by forcing themselves to the front of bread 
queues (Munif 2013). The ‘bread FSA’ was 
cleared out by Islamist brigades – like Ahrar 
Asham, Jabhat Al Nusra, and ISIS – but the 
population resisted their efforts to impose 
unwanted social agendas (Munif 2013). The 
Islamist brigades were initially successful but 
eventually defeated by ISIS who seized bread 
production facilities and violently purged 
criminal brigades, reducing kidnappings in 
the town (Munif 2014b). Subsequent bread 
shortages and ISIS’s efforts to exert too much 
control over the population resulted in chal-
lenges to the group (Munif 2014b). ISIS was 
expelled from Manbij in January 2014 by 
local resistance fighters and the local police 
force (Munif 2014b). However, ISIS returned 
to the city, harassing civilians and, according 
to RC president Monzer Al Salal, confiscating 
the property and houses of revolutionar-
ies and publicly executing teenager Youssef 
Mohammed Al Mohamad. Al Salal stated that 
residents and civil activists organised a suc-
cessful general strike against ISIS but that 
ISIS continues to control areas surrounding 
Manbij, making the town difficult to liber-
ate completely, despite ongoing resistance 
(Watanili 2014).
Security practices and objectives appear to 
have differed in Manbij from PYD-run areas 
and Deir Azzor in important ways. Firstly, the 
deals struck with the state in Manbij differed 
from PYD areas in that they did not result in 
the Manbij RC implementing the Syrian gov-
ernment’s security objectives. Furthermore, 
a partial accommodation with state employ-
ees put Manbij’s RC in a better position than 
the Deir Azzor LAC. Finally, while the RC 
excluded women and individuals without 
revolutionary credentials, it was not secretive 
in its formation processes in the way that the 
Deir Azzor LAC was.
Civil Society influences Council 
Formation in Dera 
Dera’s public service problems resemble 
those of other localities in Syria. Amir, a 
farmer from Dera, said that electricity from 
the national grid has halved since the begin-
ning of the crisis and for three months there 
had been none at all (Interview February 
2015). Water supplies, however, are uninter-
rupted because rebels control a water line 
supplying government areas. In Dera and 
nearby Quneitara, the composition and activ-
ities of LACs are influenced by civil society, 
international actors, and state and non-state 
armed groups. We lack data about whether 
LACs there were elected, but one civil soci-
ety activist says his organisation influenced 
greater representativeness of councils in 
Dera and Quneitara. 
Abu Ubayd’s civil society organisation 
(CSO) distributes aid in Dera and Quneitara.13 
Their activities since 2012 include medi-
cal relief, vaccinations, and running schools 
for 1200 children, earning them credibility 
Ali: The Security Gap in SyriaArt. 40, page 14 of 20
which in turn allowed them to influence 
LAC composition. Both women and IDPs – 
many who had fled fighting in southern 
Damascus – had been underrepresented 
in LACs. The CSO eventually convinced the 
LACs to include women, arguing that women 
were necessary to conduct aid assessments 
and visits to women-headed households, 
as many women may prefer not to host an 
unfamiliar man. Their CSO made aid distribu-
tion in villages conditional upon its council 
including a woman. A council of five mem-
bers was established in each village where 
the CSO worked, made up of: religious and 
tribal figures; representatives of original 
inhabitants of the village as well as IDPs; a 
CSO representative; and a woman. This con-
trasts with the narrative of council forma-
tion in Deir Azzor city and governorate and 
in Manbij, where women and IDPs were not 
included in the councils, at least not at the 
time of interviews. 
The implications of ACU policy
The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) 
is part of the formal opposition Coalition, 
tasked with providing assistance to com-
munities in need inside Syria. The individual 
security of IDPs was not an ACU policy objec-
tive when allocating aid to LACs. Although 
the voice of IDPs was eventually included in 
LACs, they were still excluded from receiv-
ing material support with implications for 
their health and material security. Policies 
of the Istanbul-based Coalition stated that 
funds sent to LACs could not be spent on 
IDPs. IDPs, it stipulated, must return to their 
own LACs for assistance. There were many 
IDPs in Quneitara from Jdeidat Artooz Al 
Fadel, south of Damascus, the site of a mas-
sacre perpetrated by government forces. The 
ACU sent US$300,000 to its LAC, perhaps 
because of the media attention the massa-
cre received. But most residents had fled to 
Quneitara where they were told that LACs 
could not disburse ACU funds to them. They 
would have to return to the site of a mas-
sacre to receive assistance, compelling IDPs 
to make a choice akin to one between safety 
and material deprivation. 
While the ACU’s resources cannot cover 
the entire Syrian population’s assistance 
needs, the management of its resources has 
important implications for individual and 
community security. The ACU does not mon-
itor funding thoroughly. Abu Ubayd’s CSO 
received a grant with little scrutiny. A grant 
could be acquired relatively easily with a list 
of names and fake signatures; no further doc-
umentation was required, facilitating waste 
and corruption. Other agencies funding his 
CSO asked for identity documentation from 
individual recipients. There is a lack of ade-
quate transparency in how the ACU works 
and spends funds. A recent audit could not 
account for $1million dollars of their budget 
(Afanasieva 2014). Furthermore, the spo-
radic and scattered nature of ACU funding 
obstructs LACs’ long-term planning. 
However, there does seem to be evidence 
that a governance project operating in both 
northern and southern Syria has improved 
the provision of services in Dera. Tamkeen14 
is a project funded by international donors 
that aims to promote transparent govern-
ance practices at the local level in opposi-
tion-held areas of Syria.15 The objective is to 
nurture nascent participatory governance 
structures through a project cycle where a 
grant of approximately US$100,000 is spent 
with transparent financial controls which 
can implement infrastructural and public 
service projects. Syrians take the lead in pro-
ject design, implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation. Where communities choose 
to devote funds to health projects, spend-
ing has implications for individual security 
(i.e. safety from harms associated with public 
health hazards) and the right of individuals 
to consultation and participation in design-
ing and implementing projects that secure 
these objectives. 
For example, Tsil, a town in Dera’ governo-
rate with an estimated population of 23,000, 
experienced heavy fighting between govern-
ment and opposition forces, including FSA 
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battalions and Jabhat Al Nusra, resulting 
in widespread damage to water and elec-
tricity infrastructure. In Tsil, the Tamkeen 
Committee (TC) included the Tsil LAC, Local 
Coordination Committees, a civil society 
coalition, and a medical NGO. The TC acts 
as a nascent governance structure and has 
adopted good governance practices like com-
munity consultation in project designs and 
transparent documentation of spending and 
activities. The Tsil TC displays detailed plans 
on public notices, posts relevant photos, vid-
eos, and financial accounts on its Facebook 
page,16 and uploads detailed information 
about each project on their website, includ-
ing photographs of ongoing and completed 
works. These include projects to repair elec-
tricity and water infrastructure; water sani-
tation and insect control; and procurement 
of hospital machinery, all with public health 
objectives. Donors closely monitor decision-
making processes and TC performance and 
Tamkeen field officers carry out field surveys 
to assess community satisfaction. Tsil scored 
highly having completed nine projects in the 
first implementation cycle in 2014 and sur-
vey respondents rated the TC as satisfactory 
or very satisfactory. 
Projects elsewhere have not all run as 
smoothly. In the first cycle, seven other TCs 
performed well in certain respects but poorly 
in others. The Tamkeen case is an ongoing and 
evolving project with generally positive early 
results. Currently there is little data sourced 
externally from Tamkeen Committees and 
implementers but Amir, the farmer from 
Dera, spoke well of Tamkeen projects which 
repaired a school and organised refuse 
collection (Interview March 2015). 
Armed conflict continues in Dera and 
Quneitara but dynamics differ from those 
in northern Syria and the role of civil society 
and international actors in making authority 
formation more inclusive and transparent 
is significant. The insecurity associated with 
being excluded from material assistance and 
processes of governance has been tempered 
by civil society intervention. 
Conclusion
The gap between individual safety and col-
lective security objectives, as well as between 
practices and objectives, remains wide in the 
different ungoverned spaces of ‘rebel-held’ 
territories in Syria. I have argued that the 
nature of the security gap cannot be disen-
tangled from political authority formation 
in different parts of Syria. In particular, the 
collective security of the Assad government 
remains the most dominant in Syria, even 
in the so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ of rebel-
held areas in northern and eastern Syria. 
Some organisations have been able to attain a 
level of success thanks to deals – explicit and 
implicit – brokered with the Syrian state, chal-
lenging the notion that the rebel-government 
dichotomy is a useful tool of analysis. 
Nascent political authorities able to govern 
with some functionality in these areas are 
those which serve, or do not threaten, the 
collective security of the Assad government, 
or which have been able to accommodate 
or compromise on their collective security 
agendas in order to gain support of the 
Syrian state or at least deflect its destructive 
blows. In Kurdish areas, the PYD is allowed 
to operate. Here, the collective security of 
the party’s interests take second place to the 
security of Assad’s government, followed by 
the collective security of the ethnic Kurdish 
community. Within LAC areas, collective 
security of the Syrian state imposes itself 
from the skies with bombs, and within the 
homes of Syrians whose public services it 
cuts off. Furthermore, within LACs, the col-
lective security of selective groups – clans, 
tribes, revolutionaries – can supersede that 
of the individual. Only in Manbij, (before it 
was overrun by ISIS), did accommodation 
with residents who belonged to the old 
order (and were not part of the revolu-
tion) help to improve security at local lev-
els. State employees not openly involved 
in revolution continued to receive salaries 
and electricity infrastructure was relatively 
intact, but the state seems aware of who 
and who is not a threat to its collective 
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security – possibly a  result of information 
flowing from informants – and here has 
spared ISIS from the level of bombardment 
which state forces conduct elsewhere in Syria. 
In southern Syria it does appear that, in 
a small number of cases, more participa-
tory structures have emerged. This could be 
because of the involvement of civil society 
in authority formation and the influence of 
international actors, although it could also 
be partly due to the different dynamic of the 
conflict there. 
Individual security typically comes at the 
bottom of the list of objectives. It is unfair 
in the extremely dangerous and constrained 
circumstances within which many LACs 
operate to make normative judgements 
about their practices. They are working in 
ungoverned spaces engineered by the Syrian 
state (and deemed to challenge its security) 
and lack the resources afforded to the PYD 
by the Syrian state. The secretive elections 
of LACs can be seen as a symptom of this 
engineering. 
This paper has attempted to look at what is 
taking place without insisting on what ought 
to be, and in light of what is possible in the 
circumstances. In the politics of belonging 
which have emerged from Syria’s war, the 
government is content to send the mes-
sage that individuals and collectives which 
challenge its own security objectives do not 
belong in Syria; these actors are considered 
terrorists, saboteurs, or traitors. Historically, 
states and aspiring state actors have actively 
forced populations to leave territories they 
control, or seek to control (Ali 2011), and the 
Syrian government is no different. It allows 
Syrians from sites of resistance to take ref-
uge in government territories like Latakia 
(Sahlawi 2013) as long as they do not attempt 
to challenge its security (or are not already 
known to have done so) and accept further 
compromises to their individual security as 
a consequence of displacement. Those who 
do not accept these parameters can exit Syria 
and remain abroad. Across Syria, the gap 
between collective and individual security 
remains wide, and is getting wider. 
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Notes
 1 The PYD’s development and complex 
relations with other Kurdish parties in 
Syria and Iraq is dealt with in more detail 
by Lowe (2014).




 3 See articles 25–26, 32a, 73–74, and 91b.
 4 For detailed analysis of these structures, 
see ICG 2014. 






 6 The story of the YPJ brigades fighting 
ISIS received attention in media outlets 
including the BBC, CNN, Al Arabiya News, 
The Daily Mail, and Marie Claire.
 7 The author asked the question after Saleh 
Muslim’s talk at the London School of 
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Economics. He struggled to answer until 
prompted by the author about constitu-
tion writing to which he immediately 
said ‘yes’ and moved to answer the next 
question. 
 8 ISIS demolished Kurdish houses on 
the pretext they were ‘PKK houses.’ See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efp
CZdyMkSE&feature=youtu.be.
 9 See: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
tr/security/2013/05/tensions-iraqi-
kurdistan-syria-barzani.html#
 10 Kurdwatch.com documents many more 
violations.
 11 See also http://www.kurdwatch.org/index. 
php?cid=185&z=en
 12 A recent example is the Burkan Al Furat – 
Euphrates Volcano – alliance between 
YPG and FSA units, as well as other para-
militaries, in the fight against ISIS.
 13 His Skype interview forms the basis of this 
section. I am grateful to Rim Turkmani for 
conducting this interview and that with 
‘Amir,’ as part of collaborative research 
into Syria’s political economy of war.
 14 See http://www.project-tamkeen.org/ 
 15 This section is based on an interview with 
Tristan Salmon who is a Monitoring and 
Evaluation Advisor on the Tamkeen pro-
ject in Syria. Any errors in representation 
of the programme are my own. 
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